Internet content and consumer digital surplus

It is increasingly being argued that the Internet provides “digital surplus” to consumers and that this surplus is a means of understanding the value of the Internet to users and society. Measuring the surplus presents a host of challenges, however.

First, the Internet does not produce content. Private enterprises, public entities, and individuals create content with different motives and compensation demands. These are offered under varying business strategies that determine how and how often the content is available on the internet.

Secondly, Internet gateways—ISPs, search engines, and aggregators—have a significant influence on consumers’ content choices. Consumers use relatively few gateway services, but they access content from multiple providers. The nature and sources of that content are highly influenced by the gateways, their preferred content providers, and the algorithms they employ in filtering content.

Determining whether consumers obtain value for money in terms of price, service, and quality from their expenditures for the Internet and its content is complex because it involves two separate transactions: 1) access to internet through the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and 2) access to content.

The term “consumer digital surplus” derives from the concept of consumer surplus that economists use as a measure of satisfaction of consumer demand. It is based on a determination whether the value received—measured by consumer willingness to pay at given prices—is higher than the market price for the service or product and thus indicating the extent to which consumers are getting a better deal (consumer surplus) than they would have accepted.

There are significant challenges in applying the concept of consumer surplus to digital consumption.

The first challenge is determining what people are willing to pay. There are some accepted methods of calculating it, but it is far easier to measure willingness to pay for access than for content.

The second challenge is that most people now pay for multiple Internet access points rather than a single access point. In Europe, for example, 65% of Europeans have internet access in their home, 52% have internet access via mobile phones, and about 20% of smartphone users also own tablets. Calculating surplus must thus account for use and demand across the platforms. The methods and metrics for doing so remain crude and highly imperfect.

The third challenge is that Internet access through ISPs is often bundled with other services including telephone and television cable services.  This masks the actual price for Internet access and makes determining the surplus related to Internet service and content complicated.

A fourth challenge is that there is a huge oversupply of content creating an imperfect market. Although large amounts of content are used by consumers, there is huge under-use of content because of the scale of content available. There are about 1.2 billion websites on the internet providing at least a trillion Web pages, for example. The overprovision challenge also applies to paid content services and iTunes, for example, offers about 37 million songs, but its average customer has acquired fewer than 100 songs. What is not consumed or consumed infrequently must been seen as having lower value to individual consumers and accounted for accordingly in any determination of surplus.

A final challenge is that much digital content consumption does not involve direct purchase. Most is provided free in exchange for attention or engagement that is desired by others for promotional or advertising purposes. Calculating surplus on consumption without a price is complex. Even when payments are made for content—something done by less than 2 in 10 consumers—most paid content is obtained through a subscription. This creates challenges of accounting for sunk costs and diminishing marginal utility of access to additional content before consumer surplus can be established.

We do know that consumers are receiving value from Internet content and that some types of content are more valuable than others.

There is greater willingness to pay for video entertainment than news and information. However, free video remains highly attractive, evidenced by the 1 billion unique visitors that access YouTube monthly. Nevertheless, paid video content is becoming the norm for professionally produced entertainment. Netflix, for example, had $5.5 billion in revenue from 35 million subscribers in 2014.

Video is more attractive to consumers overall than other types of content and today about 90% of all internet traffic and about 55% of all mobile traffic is video.

Like other communication platforms before it, the Internet has great potential for many types of communication, but is clearly becoming a video entertainment-dominated system that is in direct competition with other video entertainment platforms. Nevertheless, it remains is a platform in which multiple consumer preferences can be pursued and in which the consumer surplus for different content at different times varies significantly. The means for fully understanding that variance and measuring it remain elusive.

Comcast and Time Warner just can't control themselves

Comcast and Time Warner are awaiting regulatory responses to their application to merge and become the dominant player in cable television provision in the U.S. If permitted, the combined firm will control about 2/3rd of the broadband cable market and about 40% of the entire broadband market in the U.S. (which is used for both cable and the Internet).

Independently, the two firms both have reputations for poor installation and repair services, poor billing and collection practices, high prices, and price increases above inflation levels. No one seriously believes their claims that the merger will be pro competitive, lead to more consumer choice, better service and lower prices.

The companies have not been helping their case by appearing to be operations out of control when it comes to their customers.
 
In recent months customers seeking services have been kept on the phone for hours and forced to undergo forms of psychological abuse while they tried to get the changes they wished. 

Customers who have complained about billing practices and service have had their first names on their accounts changed to names such as “asshole,” “cunt”, “whore,” “dummy”, and “super bitch” and subsequent mailings were sent to their homes with those names on the official company correspondence.

If they can’t manage the firms now, imagine what it will be like if the larger combined firm is permitted and has even less incentive for better behavior.

The internal cultures of the companies apparently do not make treating customers badly risky for employees and the cultures may even provoke it through the high pressure placed on customer service representatives to retain customers and processes designed make it difficult for customers to switch services. The fact that there is a continuing litany of poor behavior indicates the their managers are unwilling or unable to control their employees and that they can't even structure their information systems to stop such things from occurring.

The companies' long histories of treating customers poorly obviously rubs off on their workers. It reminds one of comedian Lilly Tomlin’s character Ernestine, a telephone operator, who reacted to customer complaints saying "We don't care. We don't have to. We're the Phone Company."

The fundamental root of the Comcast and Time Warner problems is that there is essentially no discipline in the market for cable services.  Because  both companies tend to have local monopolies in the locations in which they operate, and face limited competition from satellite TV, the market itself is not correcting for bad behavior. This problem is compounded because there is essentially no regulatory oversight for cable services and customer service either. The cable companies have the best of both worlds: no market pressure and no regulatory pressure.

None of that will change if the merger of the two companies is permitted. It will only get worse.

Customers are valuable to companies and the two companies continue to mistreat them at their peril. A significant number of customers are already stopping cable services in favor of video downloads and streams from the Internet. In time, this may increase to the point it forces the companies to treat their customers better. But it will probably be too late.

In the meantime, the only hope is that regulators will try to keep things from getting worse by refusing to allow the two firms to merge.

The critical distinctions among news provision, information provision, and journalism

The explosive growth of digital news and information providers is forcing news organizations to recognize their diminishing significance to users of digital devices, but many remain bewildered about how to respond.

This challenge is difficult because many news personnel do not make distinctions among news provision, information provision, and journalism. Consequently, the strategies of many news organizations approach each as equally valuable. They are not.

News provision involves providing reports about contemporary events and developments locally, nationally, and globally. Information provision involves providing non-news content that meets audience interests and needs. Journalism involves researching and producing news, features, and analytical stories based on professional practices and norms.

In the past, news organizations tended to have strong control over journalism, news provision, and information provision in their markets. However, they began losing that control with the arrival of multichannel terrestrial/cable/satellite television, the growth of magazine titles, and the appearance of the Internet.

It is this loss of traditional market domination over the provision of news and information that most news organizations are struggling with today.

The problem is clearly illustrated by newspapers that typically offered readers non-advertising content that was about 25% news (created through original journalism or provided from news agency stories) and 75% information (either self produced or provided by news agencies and syndication services). It was a cost effective and holistic way to serve readers news and information needs.

That strategic formula doesn’t work today, especially on digital platforms, because there is a plethora of digital information provision about weather, entertainment, food and cooking, sports, automobiles, and hobbies and crafts and because there is a surfeit of news providers about national and international events and developments.

This high level of competition means that newspapers and other legacy news organizations have a much harder time becoming or remaining the digital choice for news and information provision. There is little additional value they can provide by merely being a conduit for flow-of-events news and information available elsewhere.

Value can be created by practicing quality original journalism, however, and by providing context, analysis, and understanding to news and creating better information, provided in better ways, than competitors.

Only by understanding the differences between news provision, information provision, and journalism, by being different from other news and information providers, by having a distinct approach to news and information, by engaging in high quality journalism, and by helping audiences better understand the world and the topics in which they are interested will news organizations become successful in the digital world.